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CONDITIONAL SUBSCRIPTIONS TO THE CAPITAL
STOCK OF CORPORATIONS.
In the early days of corporations, before the underlying
principles which govern the relations of a corporation with its
members on the one hand and its creditors on the other were
developed, a usual practice in seeking for subscribers to a new
company was for the company's agent, or the commissioners
appointed under the statute, to make certain promises whether
to one or more of the subscribers, and either in the contract
itself or by parol, which promises were with more or less
propriety and very naturally regarded by the subscribers as
conditions upon the performance of which only they were to
be held to their subscriptions. This practice, harmless enough
in its inception and purpose, afforded a ready means to
speculators with doubtful authority of raising necessary sums,
and, therefore, became the means of occasioning not only
much confusion in the law, but also considerable diversity of
opinion in the minds of various courts, which has resulted at
length in the formation of two entirely distinct and conflicting
lines of decisions.
It seems advisable, however, before discussing these, to clear
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the way by eliminating from the field of discussion one
familiar condition (so called) which stands quite on a different
footing from the rest, i. e., the condition that all of the capital
stock shall be subscribed for before any one subscriber shall
become liable to pay for his shares. In the absence of a
contrary statute, it seems clear that the promise of a subscriber,
whether so expressed in his contract or not, is as a matter of
fact intended to be, and therefore should as a matter of law
be regarded as, dependent upon a subscription to the full
amount named in the charter or constating instrument. One
of the most useful features of modern business corporations is
the opportunity afforded to accomplish with others what would
be impossible for one man unaided; and it is apprehended
that few indeed would be the subscriptions of large enter-
prises, if it were thought or known that each subscriber might
by himself or with a few fellows only be required to carry out
an enterprise planned for many hands or much capital.
Conformably to this principle of natural justice, the courts
have from an early date upheld the requirement of a full bona
fide subscription by competent persons before holding liable
any particular subscriber, and particularly is this the case
where the charter contains an express condition to that effect
(though on principle such condition ought to be readily implied
by law).' Salem Mill Dam Co. v. Roper (1829), 9 Pick. 187
was a case where a charter authorized no call except for pre-
liminary expenses' of organization until the whole amount
had been subscribed; the evidence showed that the number
could only be regarded as completed by counting thirty
shares subscribed for by one man in another's name, and
without authority. As the call was professedly "for materials
purchased or contracted for, to be used in carrying forward
and completing the general purposes" of the institution, it was
held that the actual deficit of thirty shares suspended the
I The rule is the same where the amount of stock has been fixed by the
corporation itself: Hoagland v. C. & Ft. W. R. R. (1862), 18 Ind. 45;
Payson v. Withers (1873), 5 Biss. C. C. 269. But see Kennebec R. R. v.
Jarvis (1852), 34 Me. 360; Proprietor's Hotel (1856), 6 Mass. 586.
2 This point about preliminary expenses is amplified in Central Turn-
pike Co. v. Valentine (183o), 10 Pick. 142.
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power of levying and collecting assessments, and plaintiff
company could not recover. The doctrine is subsequently
explained by the same court in the most satisfactory manner,
Dewey, J., in Cabot & West Springfield Bridge Co. v. Chapin
(185o), 6 Cush. 5o, saying: "The true construction of the
contract of the defendants is that they were to take and pay
for three shares in a stock company, the capital -stock of which
was to consist of 400 shares of $ioo each. Before the
making of the subscription by the defendants the capital stock
and the number of shares had been fixed by the corporation.
The number of shares and the sum to be paid for each being
thus fixed and inserted in the articles of subscription, the
subscription was to that extent a conditional one, and every
subscriber was at liberty to refuse to proceed with the proposed
undertaking until the requisite number of shares had been
taken. It might materially affect the interests of the sub-
scribers whether the whole number of shares or a less amount
was subscribed for..... .The whole undertaking as a
matter of profit and loss to the subscribers might depend upon
having the full amount of the capital taken up." Stoneham
B. R. Co. v. Gould (1854), 2 Gray, 278, declares the rule as
follows: "It is a rule of law too well settled to be now
questioned, that when the capital stock and number of shares
are fixed by the act of incorporation or by any vote or by law
passed conformably to the act of incorporation, no assessment
can be lawfully made upon the share of any subscriber until
the whole number of shares has been taken. This is no
arbitrary rule: it is founded on a plain dictate of justice and
the strict principles regulating the obligation af contracts.
When a man subscribes for a share of stock to consist of I ooo
shares, he binds himself to pay I/IOOO part of the cost of the
enterprise. If only 50o shares are subscribed, he would be
liable to assessments to pay a 15OO part of the cost, besides
running the risk of entire failure and loss of the amount
advanced." The authorities are innumerable which support
this rule.'
I Company v. Theobald (1828), I Moo. & M. 15I; Pitchford v. Davis
(1839), 5 M. & W. 2; iCarlisle v. Cahawba R. R. (1842), 4 Ala. 76;
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As already stated, no doubt can exist as to the legality of
the condition, when imposed either by the charter itself or by
the terms of the subscription paper, that all the capital stock
shall be subscribed before any single subscriber can be held
Littleton Co. v. Parker (1844), 14 N. H. 543; Atlantic Cotton Mills v.
Abbott (1852), 9 Cush. 423; Penobscot R. R. v. Dunn (1855), 39 Me.
587, holding that the books of the company are competent to prove such
full subscription; Galvanized Iron Co. v. Westoby (1852), 8 Bxch. 17;
Penobscot R. R. v. Dunn (1855), 4o Me. 172, holding that if the subscrip-
tion is once completed, it is immaterial that some subscribers prove
unable to pay-which is a chance every one takes; N. H. Central R. R.
v. Johnson (1855), 3o N. H. 390; Controcook Valley R. R. v. Baker
(1855), 32 N. H. 363; Penobscot R. R. v. White (1856), 41 Me. 512,
reiterating the doctrine of Penobscot R. R. v. Drummer, supra, and insist-
ing only on the bona fides of the full subscription; People's Ferry Co. v.
Balch (1857), 8 Gray, 303; Kirksey v. Florida R. R. (1857), 7 Fla. 23;
Atlantic Co. v. Mason (1858), 5 R. I. 463 ; Penobscot R. R. v. Bartlett
(1858) 12 Gray, 244, where upon similar facts the Massachusetts court
arrived at the same conclusion as had the Maine court in Penobscot R. R.
v. Dunn, supra; Fry v. Lexington R. R. (1859), 2 Metc. Ky. 314; Lewis
Island R. R. Co. v. Bolton (186o), 48 Me. 45r; Topeka Bridge Co. v.
Cummings (1864), 3 Kan. 55, where the same rule was applied, though
the contemplated structure had, in fact, been erected; Chase v. Sycamore
R. R. (1865), 38 Il. 215, Hughes, v. Antietam Mfg. Co. (1870), 34 Md.
317; Childs v. Smith (x869), 55 Barb. 45; Read v. Memphis Gas Co.
(872), 9 Heisk. 545; Peoria R. R. v. Preston (1872), 35 Ia. II8; Somerset
R. R. v. Clarke (1873 , 6i Me. 384; Livesey v. Omaha Hotel Co. (1876),
5 Neb. 5o; Belfast R. R. Co. v. Cottrell (1876), 66 Me. 185; St. Paul R. R.
v. Robbins (1877), 23"Minn. 439; Allman v. Havana R. R. (1878), 88 111.
521; Santa Cruz R. R. v. Schwartz (1878), 53 Cal. io6; Cheraw R. R. v.
Garland (r88o), 14 S. C. 63; Bray v. Farwell (I88O), 8i N. Y. 6oo;
Hale v. Sanborn (1884), 16 Neb. i ; Rockland Mt. Desert Co. v. Sewall
(1886), 12 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. (Mass.) 85; :Exposition Rwy. & Imp.
Co. v. Canal St. R. Co. (189o), 42 La. Ann. 370; Masonic Temple v.
Channell (1890), 45 N. W. (Minn.) 716. "No question is made that at
common law, where the charter or articles of incorporation or terms of
subscription make no different rule, payment of the subscription to the
capital stock of a corporation cannot be required until the whole amount
of stock has been subscribed. There are solid reasons for the rule-
reasons based not only on considerations of public policy but on the
presumed understanding and intention of the subscriber ..... It is,
therefore, implied in the contract of subscription as a condition precedent
to its being in force, that the entire amount of-stock shall be subscribed
for. Of course, if the articles of incorporation provide that payment of
subscription shall be called for before the whole stock is subscribed, that,
as between the parties, is binding." Orynski v. Loustaman (i89i), i5
S. W. (Tex.) 674; Spellier Time Co. v. Leedom (1892), 24 Atl. (Pa.)
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to his promise, such condition being so agreeable to public
policy as well as to common sense that it is often implied by
law. But this legal implication is so far subject to to the will
of the parties that it can be entirely set aside by mutual
consent, which is inferred in those numerous cases where the
governing law authorizes business to be begun and the sub-
scriptions to be collected as soon as a certain fraction of the
entire capital or a fixed sum of money has been subscribed.'
The simple principle is thus described in Penobscot R. R. v.
Dunn (1855), 39 Me. 587 : "Such conditions are ordinarily
incorporated into subscriptions for the protection of the sub-
scribers, and to insure the completion of the enterprise.
When a subscription is made upon condition that the company
shall not be organized or shall not enter upon the principal
object of its organization until a given amount of its stock
shall be subscribed, such condition is a condition precedent,
and the company will not be authorized to enforce the collec-
tion of such subscription until they have complied with such
condition on its part. A person might be willing to become
a stockholder in a railroad corporation which should have
197 ; Denny Hotel Co. v. Schram (1893), 32 Pac. (Wash.) 1002 ; Lock Co.
v. Hockaday (1893), 16 S. B. (Va.) 677.
That the law of waiver applies to this, as well as to other classes of
conditions, see Ossipee Hosiery Co. v. Canney (1874), 54 N. H. 295;
Ridgway R; R. v. Boush (1875), 43 Conn. 86; St. Charles Co. v. Britton
(1876), 2 Mo. App. 290; Musgrave v. Morison (1880), 54 Md. 16I; R. Mt.
D. &S. Co. v. Sewall (1886), 78 Me. 167 ; Match Co. v. Senwright (1889)
i6 C. of S. Cases 989; Exposition Railway Co. v. Canal St. Railway Co.
(1890), 7 So. (La.) 627; Cotton Mills v. Trimble (I89r), 15 S. W. (Ark.)
776; Anderson v. Middle Term R. R. (1892), 17S. W. (Tenn.) 803;
Auburn Opera Association v. Hill (1893), 32 Pac. (Cal.) 587; Portland
Co. v. Spillman (1893), 32 Pac. (Ore.) 688.
For illustrations of conduct not amounting to a waiver in this same
class of cases, see Orynski v. Loustaman (189I), I5 S. W. 674; Denny
Hotel Co. v. Schram (I893), 32 Pac. (Wash.) 1002, holding that payment
made in ignorance of the facts was no waiver; Hards v. Plattlley Co. Va.
(1893), 35 Neb. 263.
Failure to secure the entire capital after a reasonable time is evidence
of abandonment: Fountain Ferry Co. v. Jewell (1848), 8 B. Mon. 41.
I This is the correct explanation of Schenectady Co. v. Thatcher (1854),
iI N. Y. 102, which, however, goes too far in saying that the full sub-
scription is only necessary when required by statute.
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.$400,ooo of its stock subscribed before its organization and
$700,ooo before entering into a contract for building and
completing its road who would be unwilling to subscribe to its
stock without restriction."'
Central Turnpike Co. v. Valentine (1830), io Pick. 142,
had settled the right of the subscriber to demand that all the
required capital should be subscribed before he is called upon.
This amount of required capital may be fixed in the charter,
or that instrument may simply prescribe the means for fixing
it-which means when once adopted will be equally effica-
cious. So, in Lexington, Etc., R. R. Co. v. Chandler (847),
13 Metc. 311, where the act provided for "not more than
two thousand shares, the number of which to be determined
from time to time by the directors of the company," a stock-
holder was held bound from and after the time at which the
directors fixed the number of shares.
2
Not only must the required amount of capital be subscribed
for, but ordinarily it must be subscribed for in cash on the
theory that a subscription is based upon so much money
being put into the enterprise; and it is apprehended that the
cases establish this rule quite apart from the question, here-
after to be discussed, whether conditional subscriptions are in
1 Harlem Canal Co. v. Seixas (1829), 2 Hall, 504; City Hotel v. Dick-
inson (r856), 6 Gray, 586; SomersetR. R. v. Cushing (I858), 45 Me. 524;
P. & K. R. R. v. Bartlett (1858), 78 Mass. 244; Boston R. R. v. Well-
ington (1873), 113 Mass. 79; HanoverJunction R. R. v. Haldeman (1876),
82 Pa. 36, where the statute gave the corporation full powers when ten
per cent. of its stock had been subscribed for; St. Charles Co. v. Button
(1876), 2 Mo. App. 290; Cherew R. R. v. Garland (188o), 14 S. C. 63;
Brand v. R. R. (I886), 77 Ga. 506; Galena R. R. v. Ennor (i886), I16
Ill. 55; Cal. So. Hotel Co. v. Russell (189i), 88 Cal. 277. See, also,
Hoagland v. Cincinnati R. R. (1862), i8 Ind. 452; Hunt v. Kansas
Bridge Co. (1873), 11 Kan. 31r1r; Livesey v. Omaha Hotel Co. (1876),
5 Neb. 5o; Emmitt v. Springfield R. R. (1876), 31 0. 23, where sub-
scriber waived his right to withdraw; Nangatuck Co. v. Nichols (i891),
2o At. (Conn. 315), where the court refused the subscriber permission to
withdraw, construing the charter provision as intended to protect
creditor's rights only.
2 Worcester, Etc., R. R. v. Warren Hinds (1851), 8 Cush. rio; Rock-
land Co. v. Sewall (1888), 14 Atl. (Me.) 939; Haskell v. Worthington
(i888), 7 S. XV. (Mo.) 981. But see Kennebec R. R. Co. v. Jarvis (1852),
34 Me. 360.
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'themselves valid or not. So, in Troy R. R. v. Newton (I857),
8 Gray, 596, it was held that a contractor's subscription for
stock which he was to receive in payment of his services, and
another subscription conditional upon the railroad being located
between two points specified, should not be included in deter-
mining whether the requisite number had been subscribed.'
Further, the rule has no application to a going concern
increasing its capital stock; the contrary rule there prevailing
and the reasons therefor are well illustrated in Nutter v. Lex-
ington R. R. Co. (1856), 6 Gray, 85. Nutter's assignor had
subscribed to part of an authorized new issue of six hundred
shares of stock, and had paid for them; his assignee having
discovered that the entire issue had never been taken up, now
sues to recover back the money paid, claiming that the same
implied condition existed here that was admitted to exist in
the case of a newly forming corporation; but the court de-
cided against him, pointing out that in the present case, the
corporation being already in active existence, the issue of new
stock was not a condition precedent to corporate existence, but
was merely an auxiliary project which might either succeed or
partially or totally fail without affecting the continuity of the
corporate life or the validity of the corporate contracts.2 The
I N. Y. Exchange Co. v. DeWolf (1865), 31 N. Y. 273, condemning
fraudulent subscription; Philips v. Covington Co. (1859), 2 Metc. 219;
Rutland R. R. v. Thrall (1863), 35 Vt. 535; N. Y. R. R. v. Hunt (1872),
39 Conn. 75; Holman v. State (1885), 1O5 Ind. 569; Cal. So. Hotel Co.
v. Russell (1891), 88 Cal. 277. Compare Hahn's App. (1887), 44 Leg.
Int. (Pa.) 38, criticising a married woman's subscription; Cal. So. Hotel
Co. v. Russell (1891), 88 Cal 277, holding that directors cannot as against
a dissenting stockholder ratify unauthorized subscriptions and thus
bind him.
2 White Mts. R. R. v. Eastman (1856), 34 N. H. 124, where the charter
limiting the number of shares between 5oo and lo,ooo, it was held that
company might levy an assessment after 5oo shares had been subscribed
before actually deciding what the ultimate number of shares was to be;
Iowa, Etc., R. R. v. Perkins (1869), 28 Ia. 281; Clarke v. Thomas (1877),
34 0. 46. But a condition may properly be imported into the subscrip-
tions to the increase that they shall be void unless the entire amount is
subscribed: Hahn's App. (1886), 7 At. (Pa.) 482, exonerating the de-
fendant because a part of the subscriptions had been made by two
married women who could not be bound by such a contract, even though
they may hold and transfer stock.
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decision, of course, was not intended to, and does not, apply
to the case where such a condition is actually made a condi-
tion of the legality of the new issue.
And the rule is thus restated in the recent case of P. & F.
R. Co. v. Speirnan (1893), 32 Pac. (Oregon) 688, where the
court disposes of an ingenious argument based upon the
Pennsylvania view of conditional subscriptions: "It is argued
that the conditional subscription having been made before an
organization was effected must be considered absolute and
unqualified, and the conditions attached thereto void. In
support of this conclusion we are cited to Putman v. R. R.,
16 Wall. 396; Caley v. R. R., 8o Pa. 367; Boyd v. R. R., 90
Pa. 172. These decisions were made under the statutes of
Pennsylvania and Indiana, which require as a condition pre-
cedent to granting a charter for a railroad corporation that a
certain amount of capital stock shall be subscribed, and upon
the faith of which the charter is issued. . . . Under these
statutes any conditions attached to the subscription are held
void as a fraud upon the state corporate creditors and other
subscribers: R. R. v. Beggar, 34 Pa. 455." The learned
justice simply adds that this peculiar interpretation does not
hold in Oregon.
It should, perhaps, be added that the requirements of the
law are satisfied when a bona fide subscription of the full
(or required) amount of capital has been made; the subscriber
cannot then escape liability by showing that some of the sub-
scribers repudiated their obligation. So decided in West v.
Crawford (1889), 8o.Cal. '9.
In Ridgway R. R. v. Brush (1875), 43 Conn. 86, a certain
M. & Co. had subscribed to a part of the requisite number by
an agreement on its face like all the other subscriptions, but
under a secret arrangement with the directors by which only
one-half was to be paid in cash and the other half in work and
materials-for M. & Co. were contractors. The agreement
was bonafide on the part of the directors to the extent of their
honestly believing that M. & Co. were at least competent to
fulfil the resulting contract, but the event proved otherwise,
for M. & Co. quit work when very little had been accom-
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plished. In all of this transaction and especially in the
obvious consequence that the company was thus to all intents
deficient in just that amount of subscription, Brush saw an
opportunity to rest his own unwillingness to pay for his sub-
scription; his case evidently hinged on the legality of M. &
Co.'s contract, and the court, taking the bull by the horns and
adopting the principle of White Aits. R. R. v. Eastman (1856),
34 N. H. 124, decided that the parol agreement was void as
to other subscribers, who could have insisted upon it and
therefore cannot regard it as a nullity in this action. The
question of estoppel thereupon became unimportant,' and the
exposition of that doctrine may be passed over as dicta.
Before concluding this subject, an exception to the rule as
stated should be noted in that while a call for ordinary ex-
penses of operation of a company cannot be sustained until all
the capital is subscribed, a special call for purpose of meeting
expenses of organization may be made at any time; this is
clearly stated in Salem Mil Dam Co. v. Roper (1829), 9 Pick.
187, where, however, the call had been levied expressly " for
materials purchased or contracted for to be used in carrying
forward and completing the general purpose of the institution,"
and (it appearing that part of the required number of shares
had been subscribed for by an agent who had no authority to
act for his principal) was evidently illegal.'
Quite a different rule prevails with reference to subscribers
to an increase of the capital stock-a subject which is entitled
to a passing mention. As contrasted with the position of a
subscriber to the stock of a new corporation, the subscriber to
I See Stilman v. Dougherty (1875), 44 Md. 38o, where defendant was
held estopped from setting up the incomplete subscription list by reason
of his intimate connection with the affairs of the company.
2 In addition to cases heretofore cited see.Central Turnpike Co. v. Val-
entine (i83o), IO Pick. I42; Stoneham R. R. v. Gould (1854), 2 Gray,
277; Carlisle v. Cahawba R. R. (1842), 4 Ala. 76. Indeed, the whole
principle, as stated in the case last cited, may safely be rested on the
general ground that the corporation must comply with all the require-
ments of its charter before attaining its real corporate existence. Cf.
Price v. Grand Rapids R. R. (1859), 13 Ind. 58; Cowley v. Id., id. 6r ;
Hamilton v. Id., id. 347; People's Mutual Ins. Co. v. Westcott (186o),
14 Gray, 440.
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an increase of the capital stock of an existing corporation
may claim, perhaps, an advantage, but in respect of the
question in discussion, his rights are distinctly inferior. It is
probably putting it too strongly to say that the courts are
opposed to increasing stock, nor is there any principle of
public policy on which such opposition might be grounded;
certain it is, however, that they have always been ready to
release such subscriber, if in any way the statutes governing
the increase have been slighted or disregarded. So, in the
case of national banks, whose increase of stock is governed
by § 5142 of the Revised Statutes and Act of May 6, 1886, it
is held that where it is made without the consent of two-
thirds of the stockholders, and without the certificate and
approval of the comptroller of the currency, the entire pro-
ceeding is invalid, and preliminary subscriptions cannot be
enforced.' Nor can one who subscribes for part of an increase,
which is not actually made, and who without his knowledge
receives old shares and receipts for dividends upon them, be
estopped from denying his liability for an assessment which
valid as to old was of course ineffectual as to any new shares.2
Fitzpatrick v. Publishing Co. (1887), 83 Ala. 604, seems to
indicate that an equally stern rule is applied to corporations
incorporated under state laws and governed entirely by them.
The disadvantage of the subscriber to the new stock is that
he is bound by his promise whether or not the proposed
increase is entirely taken up, and consequently though he
may be the only subscriber. This view, which is generally
accepted, is based upon the theory that creditors must be
taken to have relied upon the least amount of capital upon
which the company is authorized to begin business. Ob-
viously, if the creditors are the only interested parties to this
contract, the argument is sound; but one may express a
doubt whether the objection that a subscriber may have not
contemplated such a result of his contract or offer has not
been lost sight of 3
'Winters v. Armstrong (889), 37 Fed. 508.
Stephens v. Foliet (189o), 43 Pac. 842.
Avengo v. Bank (r888), 40 La. Ann. 799- No difficulty is experienced
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Having thus considered a class of conditions which are
always favored by the courts, we pause for a moment, before
entering upon the general subject, to note another class of
conditions which are in strong contrast with the above, being
those which are always frowned upon when they may affect
unfavorably innocent corporate creditors. Such are those by
which it is agreed between the corporation and its subscriber
that the latter shall obtain his shares for something less than
their par value.'
In Morrow v. Iron & Steel Co. (1889), 87 Tenn. 262, the
particular form the transaction took was a condition in the
subscription that the subscriber should receive in addition to
his stock an equal amount of the company's bonds secured
by a first mortgage on the company's plant; it was held in a
suit by the company to recover the amount of the subscription
that might recover the full amount, the court thus allowing
the company to repudiate the illegal stipulation without sub-
jecting itself to any liability.
To enlarge on this kind of subscriptions, vhich have been
defined as fraudulent in law, would be to trespass too far on the
Trust Fund Theory, and we therefore pass on to our main
subject, only throwing out the suggestion that possibly the real
in discriminating such cases from those holding that one who subscribes
originally after the whole amount has been allotted incurs no liabilities
and gains no privileges thereby: Terwilliger v. G. W. Tel. Co. (I87I), 59
Mll. 249; G. W. Tel. Co. v. Gray (1887), 122 Ill. 63o; G. W. Tel. Co. v.
Bush (1889), 35 Ill. App. 213.
1 Blodgett v. Morrill (1848), 20 Vt, 509; Mann v. Cooke (1850), 20
Conn. 178; Robinson v. Pittsburg R. R. (1858), 32 Pa. 334; New Albany
R. R. v. Fields (x858), IO Ind. 187; Evansville R. R. v. Posey (1859),
12 Ind. 363; Cox's Case (1863), 4 DeG. J. & S. 53; Bridger's Case (1870),
L. R. 5 Ch. App. 305; Schaeffer v. Ins. Co. (1870), 46 Mo. 248;
Peychaud v. Hood (1871), 23 La. Ann. 732; Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Mfg.
Co. (1881), 97 Ill. 537; Wetherbee v. Baker (1882), 35 N. 3. Eq. 501;
Galena R. R. v. Ennor (1886), I6 Ill. 55; Cleveland Works v. Ennor
(1886), 12 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 88, are among the cases particularly
denouncing this practice. Cf. Racine Bank v. Ayers (186o), 12 Wis. 512;
Tel. Co. v. Haight (1894), 49 Ill. App. 633, condemning a condition that
the subscriber might withdraw at any time; Armstrong v. Dansby (1894),
75 Hun. 405, deciding that as such a condition is invalid, its presence
in A's subscription is no defence to B in a suit on his. But see Huston
v. Coop. Soc. (1879), 21 Kan. 663.
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basis of the much mooted Trust Fund Theory may prove to
be nothing more than a condition imported by law on grounds
of public policy into contracts of subscription.
As preliminary to a study of our main subject, it is proper
to say that, of course, no question can arise as to the legality
of or the necessity of complying with any condition imposed
by the charter or governing law as a prerequisite to corporate
action of any kind; in such case, the company cannot sue the
subscriber for precisely the same reason that it can do no
other corporate act, viz., because it has as yet no corporate
rights. Probably the ground on which such charter provisions
and the usual private conditions most nearly meet is where
the law requires a subscription of so many thousand dollars
per mile to a railroad company's stock. Swartout v. Micih. Air
Line Co. (1872), 24 Mich. 389, is the leading case to the effect
that such a requirement is a condition precedent that must be
strictly complied with.'
The right of a corporation to accept ordinary conditional
subscriptions might be opposed on one of two grounds; on
the one hand, it may be argued on the doctrine of special
capacities that a corporation is not, at least ordinarily, en-
dowed by the legislature with such special power; and on the
other, that even assuming it had, in this respect, the same
powers as an individual, it is against public policy that public
enterprises once begun should have their progress suddenly
interrupted by the refusal of various subscribers on various
grounds to pay their subscriptions. As to the first point,
there seems no question on principle that the power in ques-
tion is incidental to that which is not only a usual power of a
corporation, but, in fact, an indispensable prerequisite to its
very existence, i. e., the right to issue stock upon receipt of
subscriptions thereto; indeed, on the strictest notions of
special capacity, one can hardly imagine a case in which an
implied power would more naturally and properly be asso-
ciated with the express language of a grant, than that of
'Lake Ontario R. R. v. Mason (1857), 16 N. Y. 451; People v.
Chambers (1871), 42 Cal. 201 (a proceeding by quo warranto for failure to
comply) ; Monroe v. R. R. (x873), 28 Mich. 272.
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annexing to the ordinary express power of accepting subscrip-
tions an implied clause, "upon such terms as to it shall seem
expedient." But probably the few courts which do object to
conditional subscriptions of any kind, place their objections
upon the more substantial ground of public policy; the reply
to them involves a classification of different kinds of sub-
scriptions, some of which appear to be entitled to very
different consideration from others. We have already seen
that all the courts agree in condemning subscriptions of a
fraudulent character, including those which are characterized
by a private arrangement by which one subscriber gains a
secret advantage over his fellows, and those which, in fact,
constitute a fraud upon the public at large because of their
manifest tendency to defeat the just claims of those dealing
with the corporation on the faith of an apparent capital.
Apart from such peculiar cases, however, it is difficult to see
how a simple conditional subscription conditioned, for ex-
ample, upon the railroad being located through a particular
town, infringes upon any principle of public policy; on the
contrary such a simple condition may both be a necessary
protection to the small subscriber as against a large corpora-
tion in whose management his rights are hardly worth con-
sidering, and on the other hand may afford a corporation
requiring a large and miscellaneous list of subscribers thelbnly
available means of obtaining money for a perfect legitimate
undertaking. Possibly, under the influence of such considera-
tions as these, the great majority of American courts have
upheld the validity of conditional subscriptions.' McMillan v.
IPresident v. McKean (1814), 11 John (N. Y.) 98, a case of a condition
imposed by a charter; Hibernia Turnpike Co. v. Henderson (1822), 8
S. & R. 219, a similar case, in which the court said: "Words more
strong, and an intention more clearly expressed to make the payment of
five dollars a share, a condition precedent to the subscription cannot be
conceived..... .If persons are permitted to subscribe without the
previous payment, large subscriptions may be made, which otherwise
could not have been made, by those who are anxious to give a direction
to the road which may benefit themselves at the expense of the public"
(it is only fair to the Pennsylvania court to say that such different
considerations apply to a condition imposed as this is by the law,
that it is quite consistent for the same court to take, as we shall
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Maysville R. R. (I854 ), 15 B. Mon. 218, is an early example: 
1
the condition there incorporated into the subscription was that
"said road shall be so located and constructed as to make
town of C a point in said road." The court readily held the
condition to be both sanctioned by the company's charter, and
not opposed to public policy. Having disposed of this point,
the court proceeded to a determination of the further question
raised by defendant, viz., whether he could be held to his
subscription when the corporation had only located, not con-
structed, its road through the aforesaid town; upon this point,
also, the court was on the plaintiff's side, saying on grounds
of common sense : "Stock was subscribed for the very purpose
find it does take, a different view of ordinary conditions precedent) ;
Roberts' Case (i85o), 3 DeG. & S. 205; Macedon R. R. v. Snediker
(1854), i8 Barb. 317; Henderson R. R. v. Lbavvell (1855), 1o B. Mon.
338; Roberts v. Mobile R. R. (1856), 32 Miss. 373 ; Clem v. New Castle
Co. (857), 9 Ind. 488; E. I. & C. R. R. v. Shearer (1858), io Ind. 244;
Jewitt v. L. I. & U. M., id. 539; New Albany R. R. v. McCormick (1858),
IO Ind. 499; Conn. & Pass. R. R. Co. v. Baxter (i86o), 32 Vt 805;
Racine Bank v. Ayres (i86o), 12 Wis. 512; Milwaukee R. R. v. Field
(i86o), 12 Wis. 341; Burlington R. R. v. Boestler (1864), i5 Ia. 555;
Chamberlain v. Painesville R. R. (1864), 15 Ohio St. 249; Taggart v. R.
R. (1869), 24 Md. 563; Mansfield R. R. v. Stout (1875), 26 Ohio St. 241,
applying the same rule after a consolidation of two corporations; Iowas
M. R. Co. v. Perkins (1869), 28 Ia. 281 ; Putnam v. New Albany (1869),
14 Biss. 365; B. & M. R. R. v. Cottrell (1876), 66 Me. 185; Bucksport &
Bangor R. R. v. Buck' (1878), 68 Me. 81; Red Wing Hotel v. Frederick
(1879), 26 Minn. 112; Union Hotel v. Hettel (i88o), 79 N. Y. 454;
Wemple v. St. Louis R. R. (1887), 120 Ill. 196; Craven v. Cotton Mills
(1889), 21 N. E. (Ind.) 98r.
I Morris Canal Co. v. Nathan (1829), 2 Hall, 239, is a still earlier example
of the principle that, at least as against the corporation, the subscriber
may incorporate into his contract any condition or warranty, existing or
subsequent, that he desires, and will not be held liable upon it unless the
condition is fulfilled or the warranty proves to be true. The condition
here was that "3o0o shares, then held by the corporation, should be
bonafide subscribed for within ninety days from date; which fact should
be certified by at least two directors and the cashier of the company."
Such certificate being produced, defendant within three days paid his
first call, but successfully defends in a suit on the second on the ground
that the statements in the certificate were false, and were known to be so
by its authors; had it not been for the first payment, the case could have
presented no difficulty, and the upper court had no difficulty in finding
that a payment on such false representations could not be construed as a
tacit admission that the condition of the offer had been complied with.
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of aiding in the construction of the road. To effect this object
it must be paid as work progresses. Postponement of pay-
ment until work should be finished is inconsistent with the
very end to be accomplished by it." The point is somewhat
aside from the question as to the validity of conditional
subscriptions, yet is so closely connected with it that it
frequently is discussed by the courts at the same time.'
Somewhat analogous are New Albany R. R. v. McCormick
(1858), IO Ind. 499, where the subscription being "to be paid
out in instalments of twenty-five per cent. every six months
after location of said road through said town of Lafayette," it
was held that it was completed by an entry on the company's
'See, also, Penobscot R. R. v. Dana (1855), 39 Me. 587; Penobscot
R. R. v. Drummer, (1855), 40 Me. 172; Evansville R. R. v. Shearer
(1858), io Ind. 244; New Albany R. R. v. Fields (1858), io Ind. 187
(which, however, restricts the conditions as follows : "Notwithstanding
conditional subscriptions may be admitted, yet prior arrangements not
expressed in the subscription between the agent of the company and the
subscriber, by which he is to have peculiar privileges extended to others
or by which his subscription is not to be collected, being made to induce
others to subscribe, are regarded as fraudulent on other subscribers and
are no defence to suit for amount subscribed"); Johnson v. Crawfords-
ville R. R. (1858), ii Ind. 28o, where a limitation was imposed upon a
certain condition which was absolutely within the control of the
,directors; Fry v. Lexington R. R. (1859), 2 Met. (Ky.) 314; R. R. v.
Winkler (i86o), 29 Md. 318; Racine Bank v. Ayres (186o), 12 Wis. 512
(which carried its permission of conditional subscriptions to the danger
line when it allowed interest on payments); Ashtabula R. R. v. Smith
(1864), 15 Ohio St. 328; Chamberlain v. Painesville R. R. (1864), 15 Ohio,
225 (where an interesting variation, susceptible of much development,
was advanced, i. e., that admitting a provision that a road be permanently
located on a certain route to be a legal condition precedent to a suit to
recover the subscription, the further condition that a freight depot be
built was a mere executory stipulation, for breach of which he might
only set off any damages resulting to himself,-this construction being
strengthened by the fact that defendant had already paid several assess-
nents as the work progressed and had, also, voted for the continuance of
the work; Basey v. Hooper(I871), 35 Md. I5; Iowa & M. & R.Co. v. Perkins
(1869), 28 Ia. 281 ; Swartout v. Mich. Air Line R. R. (1872), 24 Mich. 389 ;
Ottawa R. R. v. Hall (1878), I Ill. App. 612, countenancing what might
be described as a condition in escrow; Freeman v. Matlack (1879), 67
Ind. 99; Hotel Co. v. Frederick (1881), 26 Minn. 112; Brand v. R. 1_
(1886), 77 Ga. 5o6; Leshner v. Karshner (1890), 24 N. B. (Ohio) 882;
Armstrong v. Karshner (x8go), id. 897; Webb v. B. & E. S. R. R. (1893),
-26 Atl. (Med.) 113.
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books that "the subscriptions of stock made at Lafayette be
and are hereby accepted; " Meyer v. Blair (1888), 17 N. E.
(N. Y.) 228, where a condition that all the capital should be
reliably subscribed was held to have been complied with, in
spite of an agreement by some of the principal subscribers
with plaintiff, that if dissatisfied with his investment at the end
of one year, they would relieve him of it at cost price; Cravens
v. Eagle Cotton Mills Co. (1889), 21 N. E. (Ind.) 981,
where defendant made a subscription conditional upon a
contract of sale which was then being negotiated with another
company, being approved by a majority of the stockholders,
and the court, though apparently conceding ;the 'validity of
such an arrangement, held that as the terms of the sale were
not agreed upon at the time of defendant's subscription, he
could not object because the sale, when completed, did not
come up to his expectations.
Somewhat similar conditions are those requiring that the
road should be put under contract before the subscription
became binding, Conn. & Pass. R. R. v. Bax-ter (I86O), 32 Vt.
8o5; and those stipulating that the payments need not be
made until completion. In the latter case, the condition must
be performed; Toledo R. R. v. Hinsdale (I888), 15 N. F_
(Ohio) 665, where the court said: "Until the road was
completed the subscription could not become absolute. It
was only an offer to become a shareholder, and until the
condition should be performed, the relation of the subscriber
to the company as stockholder would not arise. By the
transfer of the subscriptions, road, etc., the original company
put it beyond its own power ever to complete the road and
render the defendant liable on his subscription." See, how-
ever, 7ferrill v. Gamble (1877), 46 Ia. 6 15, holding that a
substantial compliance by the assignee of the company was
sufficient.
Reynolds D. Brown-
(To be continued.)
